Table of Contents/Masthead by unknown
Tulsa Journal of Comparative and International Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2 Article 1
3-1-2002
Table of Contents/Masthead
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil
Part of the Law Commons
This Front Matter is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Journal of
Comparative and International Law by an authorized administrator of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact daniel-
bell@utulsa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Table of Contents/Masthead, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int'l L. i (2001).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tjcil/vol9/iss2/1
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
OF A RESIDENT ALIEN AFTER BALSYS
Sean K. Lloyd
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution was designed to provide
people with safeguards against improper government intrusion.1 One of
those safeguards is provided in the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause which states that "[n]o person.. .shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself."' This clause is designed to pro-
tect witnesses from providing evidence that they reasonably believe can
be used against them in a future criminal prosecution? This brings us to
the problems that are discussed in this note. First, who can invoke this
privilege? It is long understood that citizens of this country are protected
by the Constitution, but are resident aliens protected as well? In addition,
and most importantly, from where must the threat of future prosecution
come? Must the threat of prosecution come from courts in the United
States, or will a foreign court suffice?
Balsys started when the Office of Special Investigations of the
Criminal Division of the United States Department of Justice (OSI)
wanted to get testimony from Aloyzas Balsys relating to his activities
I U.S. CONST. amend. V:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases aris-
ing in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; now shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation.
2. See id.
3. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 441,486 (1951) (The privilege may be used only
if the witness "has a reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."); See also
Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Commission, 406 U.S. 472, 478 (1972).
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during World War II. After serving Balsys with an administrative sub-
poena, Balsys refused to answer questions relating to his activities in that
time period and asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. Balsys based this assertion on his fear that he could be
prosecuted by a foreign nation based on answers he might give.' The OSI
decided to petition the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
New York.'
The district court concluded that even though Mr. Balsys did face a
"real and substantial danger" of prosecution by other countries, he was
not allowed to invoke the Fifth Amendment when it concerned answers
given on his application for an entry visa.' The district court also stated
that if Balsys was entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment, he
waived such a privilege when he voluntarily responded to questions when
he first applied for immigration! The district court went on to say that
Balsys also failed to prove that the documents the government requested
were testimonial in nature as required by the Fifth Amendment. 9 Ac-
cordingly, the district court ruled in favor of the Government.
Balsys then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
which reversed the district court by ruling that the Fifth Amendment not
only covered domestic prosecutions but foreign prosecutions as well.1"
They also ruled that Balsys did not waive his right to this privilege when
he made voluntary statements during his application for a visa."
Appealing from this decision, the Government went to the Supreme
Court which overturned the decision of the court of appeals. In an opinion
written by Justice Souter, the court decided that fear against foreign
prosecution was beyond the scope of the Fifth Amendment and ruled in
favor of the Government. 2 This is where we stand today.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Aloyzas Balsys was born in Ansieniai, Plateliai Province, Lithuania
on February 6, 1913." In 1961, he entered the United States under the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 4 He received his immigrant visa and
4. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2220 (1998).
5- Seeid.
6. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 918 F.Supp. 588 (E.D.N.Y.1996).
7. See id. at 599-600.
8. See id. at600.
9- See id. at 600.
10. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 119 F.3d 122 (2d. Cir. 1997).
I]. See id. at 139-140.
12. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998).
13. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 918 F.Supp. 588, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
14. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2221; See also 8 U.S.C. § 1201.
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alien registration number at the American Consulate in Liverpool, Eng-
land."1 He states in his application "that he had served in the Lithuanian
army between 1934 and 1940, and had lived in hiding in... Lithuania
between 1940 and 1944."1 He swore that all the information he had
given was true and signed a statement which warned that if any of the
information he had given were untrue or misleading, he would be subject
to a criminal prosecution and, possibly, deportation.17
The Office of Special Investigations (OSI), which was "created to
institute denaturalization and deportation proceedings against suspected
Nazi war criminals," was attempting to find out if Balsys was a collabo-
rator in persecutions committed by the Nazis, which would contradict the
information he had given in his application." If the allegations against
Balsys were true, then the OSI could have him deported for not only ly-
ing on his application but for his participation in the Nazi atrocities.
After OSI issued a subpoena that required Balsys to appear at a
deposition and testify, he showed up but failed to provide any informa-
tion other than his name and address.'3 He stated that he was asserting his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination not for fear of domestic
criminal prosecution, but for the fear of possible criminal prosecution by
Lithuania, Israel or Germany.2
III. THE DISTRICT COURT
After Mr. Balsys refused to answer any questions or produce any
documents that the OSI requested, the OSI went to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of New York seeking to enforce the
administrative subpoena.22 There, the government argued that Mr. Balsys
had not proven a "real and substantial fear of foreign prosecution," that
the Fifth Amendment was not applicable when the fear of prosecution
that the claimant wishes to avoid is from a foreign power and, finally, that
the defendant had waived any claim to Fifth Amendment protection when
he voluntarily answered questions on his entrance visa.23





19. "Such activity would subject him to deportation for persecuting persons because of
their race, religion, national origin, or political opinion under §§ 1182(a)(3)(E),
1251(a)(4)(D) as well as for lying on his visa application under §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i),
1251(a)(1)(A)."Id.
20. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2221.
21. See id.
22. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 918 F.Supp. 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
23. See id. at 591.
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the court believed Mr. Balsys did "in fact face a real and substantial dan-
ger of foreign prosecution."24 However, unluckily for Balsys, the court
found that given the facts of this case, the Fifth Amendment protection
could not be extended to include fear of a possible foreign trial.' The
court also agreed with the government that even if this fear was covered
by the Fifth Amendment, Balsys waived that privilege when he voluntar-
ily answered questions during his immigration in 1961.26
In reaching this decision, the court first examined the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. They stated that the privilege
not only covered statements that were strong enough to sustain a convic-
tion, but also to statements that could lead to a conviction.27 The court
also stated the privilege covers both witnesses and defendants in both
civil and criminal trials.2"
For the test used to claim protection under this privilege, the court,
quoting Hoffman, said the privilege may only be used if the witness "has
reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer."' They fur-
ther went on to define "reasonable fear [as] one based on a prospect of
penal liability that is 'real and substantial' and not merely speculative. '
With concern about Balsys not being a naturalized citizen, the court noted
that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to resident aliens.3
After determining that the Fifth Amendment could be applied to Bal-
sys if he met the burden, the court went on to examine the fear that he
was claiming. The court stated that Balsys had no reason in the present
case to fear domestic prosecution, nor was he trying to allege that there
was a chance of domestic prosecution. Balsys' only concern was that he
might face prosecution by another country. Accordingly, the court went
on to examine whether or not Balsys could avoid answering the OSI's




27. See id. (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 1653, 1956 (1951), which stated
that the privilege "not only extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction
under a... criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claim for a... crime.").
28. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. At 591 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-445
(1972).
29. See id. at 591 (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486).
30. See id. at 591-592 (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey Investigation Commission, 406 U.S.
472, 478 (1972). See also Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53 (1989) ("The central
standard for the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by sub-
stantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards or incrimination.").
31. See id. at 592 (citing Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590,596 & n.5 (1953)).
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when the fear of prosecution comes from a foreign government.'
The problem this court was having was that as of the date of this
trial, neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit had decided this issue. In a Supreme Court case, the issue was
presented but was not ruled on. 3 The high court did say, in dicta, that if
the fear of a foreign prosecution was under the Fifth Amendment's pro-
tection, the witness could declare protection under the privilege only after
proving that his answers would "incriminate him under foreign law and
pose a substantial risk of foreign prosecution."34
Using this as a guideline, the district court followed the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Flanagan to define the test to discern the validity of the
witness's fear of foreign prosecution. 5 The Flanagan court laid out five
factors that a court must weigh to determine if the fear of a foreign prose-
cution was a legitimate concern to the witness. They said a court should:
1) focus on questions such as whether there is an existing or potential
foreign prosecution against him; 2) what foreign charges could be filed
against him; 3) whether prosecution of them would initiated or furthered
by his testimony; 4) whether any such charges would entitle the foreign
jurisdiction to have him extradited from the United States; and 5)
whether there is a likelihood that his testimony given here would be dis-
closed to the foreign government."36
When applying these five factors to this case, the district court noted
that there was no current foreign prosecution waiting for Mr. Balsys.37
The defendant argued, however, that the testimony requested by the OSI
would "incriminate him under the laws of Lithuania, Germany and Israel,
thereby subjecting him to potential prosecution."38
The court went on to examine the laws in those countries with re-
spect to crimes that Balsys could be punished for. The court noted that
Lithuania had, in 1992, created a statute that punished Nazis and Nazi
collaborators for crimes that were perpetrated against Lithuanians during
World War I? 9 The possible sentence under this statute ranged from a
minimum of five years imprisonment to a maximum of death.'
Likewise, Israel had a law to punish former Nazis and those that
32. See id. at 592.
33. See id. at 592 (citing Zicarelli, 406 U.S. 472).
34. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. At 592 (citing Zicarelli, 406 U.S. at 480-481).
35. See id. at 592 (citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Flanagan, 691 F.2d 116 (2d.
Cir. 1982).
36. See id. at 592 (quoting Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 593. Lithuania's law used against Nazi and Nazi collaborator's, supra note
9.
40. Balsys, 918 F. Supp. At 593.
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aided them.4' Unlike the Lithuanian law, this law applied extraterritorially
and carried with it a death sentence for anyone found guilty of crimes
against Jewish people.42
The German murder statute, the court found, was a bit more ambigu-
ous.43 Although it has been used in the past to convict people who com-
mitted crime against Jewish people during World War II, it is not clear
whether or not the statute may be used against citizens of other countries
who committed crimes outside of Germany's jurisdiction.'
Thus, the court ruled that Balsys definitely could be prosecuted un-
der the laws of Lithuania and Israel, but it was hesitant to agree that he
stood a chance of being prosecuted in Germany. Accordingly, the court
ruled that answers Balsys might give in the OSI's investigation could lead
to the possibility that he could incriminate himself under the laws of
Lithuania and Israel.
After determining'that there was a chance of incrimination under a
foreign law, the court under Flanagan had to contemplate the chance that
the testimony Balsys could give would be given to the Lithuanian or Is-
raeli governments. The court noted that the OSI was created "for the sole
purpose of investigating and gathering evidence of alleged Nazi collabo-
rators residing in the United States illegally, and taking legal action to
denaturalize, deport or prosecute them."'45 The court also noted that the
OSI had entered into an agreement with the Lithuanian government to
provide any information to them on possible Nazi collaborators found in
the United States.' After analyzing a Memorandum of Understanding
between the two countries, it was clear that even though Lithuania might
not be looking at Balsys, his testimony would be disclosed according to
the terms of the Memorandum. '7
Likewise, the court found that there was a considerable chance that
the United States would disclose any information it found to Israel. Even
41. See id. at 594 (citing Israel's "Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 3710-
1930).
42. Balsys, 918 F.Supp.at 594 at n. 1t.
43. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 594 (citing Germany's murder statute, [StGB] Article 211).
44. See id. Apparently the German murder statute has no statute of limitations which
allows it to be used for cases from World War 11.
45. See id. at 595.
46. See id.
47. See id. This agreement states, in part, that:
... [TJhe United States Department of Justice agree[s] to provide.., legal as-
sistance concerning the prosecution of persons suspected of having commit-
ted war crimes in World War II in Lithuania and who are now residents of
the United States-to facilitate the interview of witnesses, the conduct of
other necessary activities, the collection of documentary materials and other
information relevant to these investigations.
[Vol. 6:163
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though there was no specific agreement as with Lithuania, the OSI's past
clearly showed that it would pass along information to the Israelis.' This,
along with OSI's duty to "maintain liaison with foreign prosecution, in-
vestigation and intelligence offices," clearly shows that any information
discovered about Balsys clearly would have been passed along to Israel. 9
The last part of the Flanagan test was the possibility that Balsys
could be deported to one of the countries that could prosecute him. Balsys
could be deported if it was found that he lied on his application for a
visa.' Additionally, if it was discovered that Balsys was a Nazi collabo-
rator, his deportation would be mandatory. 1
The government tried to argue that Balsys could be sent to a country
where he wished to be deported.52 However, the court showed that there
was a great risk of that country rejecting him, thereby sending him to the
country where he is a citizen.53 Thus, the court was convinced that under
the factors in Flanagan, Balsys stood a "real and substantial" threat of
prosecution in either Lithuania or Israel. 4
After agreeing that Balsys did in fact stand a "real and substantial
danger" of foreign prosecution, the Court had to decide whether or not it
would apply the Fifth Amendment privilege to that fear. The district court
noted that all of the courts of appeals that have examined the issue have
reached different results, with some applying the privilege to the threat of
foreign prosecution, while others did not.55
In support of the OSI, the court focused on a decision from the
Fourth Circuit in Araneta, in which the court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege could not be claimed because the Fifth Amendment was
not available in the foreign court.56 To defend this ruling, the Fourth Cir-
cuit states that because "'[c]omity among nations dictates that the United
States not intrude into the law enforcement activities of other countries
conducted abroad,' the United States' own sovereignty would be com-
promised if it were required 'to forego evidence legitimately within its
reach solely because a foreign power could deploy this evidence in a
fashion not permitted within this country." 57
48. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 596. In the past, OSI had given information on another sus-
pected Nazi collaborator, Ivan Demjanjuk. Id.
49. See id. at 595-596.
50. See id. at 596.
51. See id. See Linnas v. I.N.S., 790 F.2d 1024, 1029 & n.1 (2d. Cir.) ("The deportation
of Nazi persecutors is required even though the deportee's life or freedom might be threat-
ened as a result."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986).
52. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 596.
53. See id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a).
54. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 596.
55. See id. at 597-598.
56. See id. at 597 (citing Araneta, 794. F.2d at 926).
57. See id. at 597 (quoting from Araneta, 794 F.2d at 926).
1999]
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Contrary to the Fourth Circuit's holding, the district court noted that
in the Eleventh Circuit the holding was the opposite. In a case with facts
similar to Balsys, the Eleventh Circuit in Gecas, ruled that a defendant
may claim the Fifth Amendment privilege when there is a serious threat
of prosecution by a foreign country.58 The Gecas court said that the Fifth
Amendment privilege was not only designed to prevent government in-
trusion, but it was also an "individual's personal right; [and]... a matter
of individual dignity."59
The district court noted that several other lower courts have dealt
with this issue, again with there being a split as to what the rule should
be. The court noted several district courts that agreed with Balsys' con-
tention that he should be able to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.'
One of those even came from within the Second Circuit.6
However, the Court seemed to be persuaded more by a case from the
District of Massachusetts.62 That court decided that if there was a legiti-
mate governmental purpose for the witness' testimony, then the Fifth
Amendment privilege could not be used, as it would be a slap in the face
of the sovereignty of the United States if the chance of prosecution in
another country would keep this country from performing its own laws.'
Yet the court did say that if the proceeding in which the testimony was to
be given served no legitimate purpose, then the witness could use the
privilege.'
58. See id. at 597 (citing United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549 (lth Cir.1995). In Gecas,
the defendant was an accused Nazi collaborator who refused to testify in an OSI deportation
proceeding for fear that he could be prosecuted in Lithuania, Israel, or Germany.
59. See id. at 597-598 (quoting Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1564.
60. See id. at 598.
61. In re Cardissi, 351 F.Supp. 1080 (D.Conn.1972). However, the court in Balsys was
not persuaded by the Cardissi Court's opinion and respectfully disagreed with it's finding.
Balsys at 598-599.
62. United States v. Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. 802 (D.Mass.1995).
63. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 598 (quoting Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. 802 at 809:
If a governmental interest in enforcing the organic laws of the United States
is involved, and the United States has a legitimate need for a witness's tes-
timony in furthering that interest, the privilege must yield if the sole basis
for claiming its protections is the fact that a resident of the United States
faces the likelihood of a foreign prosecution. It would be an unacceptable af-
front to the sovereignty of the United States if the operation of its laws
could be stymied by the desire of a foreign government to prosecute the
same witness.)
64. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 598 (quoting Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. 802 at 809:
On the other hand, I agree that a court of the United States should not bend
the Constitution solely to promote the foreign policy objectives of the ex-
ecutive branch, however laudable, by compelling the cooperation of a wit-
ness in a proceeding that does not have as its fundamental purpose the vindi-
[Vol. 6:163
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Accordingly, the district court in Balsys held that the Fifth Amend-
ment cannot be applied when the fear is from a foreign country and is
only designed to "regulate the relationship between federal and state gov-
ernments and their citizens."' In this instance, the court states that since
there was no chance of a domestic prosecution, there was no reason for
the government to illicit statements from Balsys that could be used in a
future domestic proceeding.'
The court believes that the "fundamental purpose of the privilege is
to protect individuals from governmental overreaching." '67 But since the
court feels that the government is not overreaching, to apply the privilege
would, in effect, keep the government from doing its job. The court was
afraid that [a] contrary decision would allow individuals attempting to
immigrate to the United States to misrepresent their personal histories
and other relevant information in order to gain access to this country.
This would leave the government without recourse and seriously erode
domestic law enforcement. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Re-
spondent is not entitled to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.'
The district court also went on to agree with the government that
when Balsys voluntarily answered questions when he applied for immi-
gration, he waived any right to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.'
There was a question of whether or not the 1961 interview and the current
request were two separate proceedings since "[s]tatements made at one
proceeding... cannot constitute a waiver of the privilege at a separate
proceeding."7 However, the court decided that the 1961 interview was
merely the beginning of the proceedings which remained open to the pre-
sent time.7 So even if Balsys was deemed able to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege, the district court said he had already waived his
right to hide behind it.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
After losing in the district court, Balsys sought an appeal with the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In its decision, the court of ap-
cation of the domestic laws of the United States.)
65. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 599. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
66. Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 599.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 599-600.
69. See id. (citing Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951); United States v. St.
Piene, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2nd Cir.1942).
70. See id. (citing United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 821 n. 3 (2d Cir.), cer. de-
nied, 431 U.S. 970 (1977).
71. Bals ys, 918 F.Supp. at 600.
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peals addressed only two issues: whether the Fifth Amendment privilege
could be asserted by a witness when there was a "real and substantial
risk" that testimony could be used against the witness in a foreign prose-
cution; and, whether Balsys waived his right to use the Fifth Amendment
privilege by voluntarily answering questions in his 1961 application
hearing." Not agreeing with the district court's reasoning, the court of
appeals reversed the lower court's holding on both issues.
When deciding whether or not the Fifth Amendment privilege can be
asserted when the fear is a foreign criminal prosecution, the appeals court
first looked to direct case law on the subject.73 Noting the Supreme Court
had declined to answer this issue, the appeals court started looking at the
way in which other circuits had ruled.74
The appeals court notes that in the Fourth Circuit under Araneta, the
court declined to allow a witness to assert the privilege.75 Also, a similar
holding has developed in the Tenth Circuit in Parker." These two circuits
aside, the appeals court seemed more convinced by the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Gecas which allowed a witness to assert the privilege.
77
The facts of Gecas were notably similar to the facts of Balsys. In Ge-
cas, the defendant invoked his right against self-incrimination at an OSI
deposition. Gecas was an accused Nazi collaborator and feared that he
could be charged in Lithuania. The court in that case thought that the
Fifth Amendment had two purposes. The first, which the district court
agrees with, is that the Fifth was designed to protect people from
"overzealous prosecution."7 It is the second purpose that the district
court did not find: to "protect individual dignity."' 9 The court in Gecas
thought that by allowing the witness to assert the privilege, it would strike
"the appropriate balance between these purposes and the important gov-
72. United States v. Balsys, 119 F.3d 122, 124 (2nd Cir. 1997).
73- See id. at 126-129.
74. See id. at 126. The court of appeals noted that the Supreme Court had come close to
deciding this issue in Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm. of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972), but since the risk was so small the Court declined to answer it. Id. In footnote 2, the
court of appeals did note that in dictum in Araneta v. United States, 478 U.S. 1301, 1304
(1986), Chief Justice Burger noted that it seemed that the Court would rule in favor of the
witness. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 127, n.2.
75. Balsys, 119 F.3d 127 (citing Araneta v. United States, 794 F.2d 920 (4th. Cir. 1986)
("The Fourth Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment does not protect a witness facing a sub-
stantial risk of foreign prosecution from compelled self-incrimination.")
76. In re Parker, 411 F.2d 1067 (10th Cir. 1969).
77. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 128 (citing United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549 (11th. Cir.
1995).
78. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 128 (citing United States v. Gecas, 50 F.3d 1549). See Balsys,
918 F. Supp. 588.
79. Balsys, 119 F.d. at 128.
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ernment interest in domestic law enforcement. ' s°
The court of appeals also cited district courts that have ruled in favor
of allowing resident aliens to assert the privilege, first citing those district
courts within the Second Circuit."1 The appeals court then went on to cite
district courts in other circuits who have ruled this way. 2 In fact, the
court of appeals only cites one case in which a district court has ruled
against applying the privilege and that was the Lileikis decision that the
District Court relied upon so heavily.83
Since the Supreme Court had yet to answer this issue, the appeals
court looked at the Supreme Court's holding in Murphy which was
"analogous" to the current dilemma. 4 The high court in Murphy looked at
whether "one jurisdiction in our federal structure may compel a witness
to give testimony which might incriminate him under the laws of another
jurisdiction." 5 The court of appeals hypothesized that the Murphy deci-
sion aided in deciding the current issue in two ways. 6 First, by looking at
the issue in regards to the purpose of the Fifth Amendment and, second,
noting that the Murphy decision itself supports allowing Balsys to be able
to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege.87
The court of appeals disagreed with the District Court "that the fun-
damental purpose of the privilege.., is to protect individuals from gov-
ernment overreaching." 8 Although the district court did believe that the
Fifth Amendment did have a "role in preserving an individual's privacy
and dignity," they did not believe that this was a "fundamental
purpose."89 The district court felt that allowing Balsys to hide under the
Fifth Amendment would "undermine" the core values that the it was de-
signed to protect.' With this, the court of appeals disagreed.
The court of appeals admitted that there are a lot of different opin-
ions concerning the purposes of the Fifth Amendment.9 However, using
the Supreme Court's opinion in Murphy, the court of appeals ascertained
80. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 128 (citing United States Y. Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1564-1565).
81. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 128 (citing In re Cardissi, 351 F.Supp. 1080, 1086 (D.Conn. 1972).
See also In re Flanagan, 533 F. Supp. 957 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 691 F.2d 116
(2d Cir. 1982).
82. Balsys, 119 F. 3d at 128 (citing In re Moses, 779 F.Supp. 857, 870 - 883 (E.D. Mich.
1991). See also Yves Farms, Inc. v. Rickett, 659 F.Supp. 932, 939-941 (M.D.Ga.1987).
83. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 128 (citing United States v. Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. 802, 809 (D.
Mass. 1955).
84. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 128.
85. See id. at 128-129 (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,
378 U.S. 52,54 (1964).
86. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 128-129.
87. Id. at 129
88. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129 (quoting Balsys, 918 F.Supp. 588, 598-599).
89. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 129 (quoting Balsys, 918 F.Supp. 588, 598-599).
90. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129 (citing Balsys, 918 F.Supp. 588, 599).
91. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 129.
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that the Fifth Amendment has three purposes: "it advances individual
integrity and privacy, it protects against the state's pursuit of its goals by
excessive means, and it promotes the systemic values of our method of
criminal justice."' The appeals court felt that by looking at all of these
purposes, it would better ascertain the true meaning of the Fifth Amend-
ment.93
In analyzing how asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege affects the
values of dignity and privacy of an individual, the appeals court found no
difference in allowing a witness to assert the privilege when the fear is
from a foreign prosecution, as opposed to a domestic prosecution.94 The
appeals court believed that the "privilege protects the innocent and better
ensures the reliability of the testimony... regardless of whether" the fear
is foreign or domestic." Just the same, the appeals court believed that the
values and policies of the American criminal justice system "are neither
promoted nor inhibited by allowing the privilege to be invoked in cases
of fear of foreign prosecution. 96
It was the last of the three stated purposes that gave the appeals court
the most trouble. The district court did not believe that there was much of
a reason for government overreaching because there was no fear of a pos-
sible domestic prosecution. 97 Although agreeing that the chance is less
here, the appeals court believed that the district court "underestimated the
danger that exists where the fear is of prosecution in foreign lands."98
The court of appeals first believes that the "government's interest in
extracting admissions in aid of foreign prosecutions is more analogous to
a domestic jurisdiction's interest in the criminal prosecution of a witness
by another domestic jurisdiction than it is to the situation in which the
92. See id. Citing Murphy, 378 U.S. at 55.
[O]ur unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel tri-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accu-
satorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that
self- incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and
abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance
by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for Jisturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the load; our respect for the inviolability of the
human personality and of the right of each individual to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements;
and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter to the
guilty, is often a protection to the innocent.
93. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 129. The court of appeals thought the district court had wrongly
narrowed the Fifth Amendment to one "cardinal purpose." Id.
94. See id. at 130.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See discussion infra Part HI;sSee also Balsys, 918 F.Supp. at 599.
98. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 130.
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'extracting' government has no interest in prosecution at all. ' With the
increase in cooperation in criminal prosecutions between nations having
risen sharply, the appeals court believes that it is only natural that the
United States will start to have an interest in foreign prosecutions much
the same as the government has interests in domestic prosecutions."
Thus the best way to avoid this kind of government mistreatment, the
court believes, is to allow "witnesses to avoid being compelled to answer
questions posed by the government at home for fear of incriminating
themselves abroad."''1 1
Also, the court of appeals noted that cases where there was a real and
substantial threat of foreign prosecution were highly correlated to cases in
which the government would overreach its authority. 1m They state that "it
would be odd indeed to suggest that the United States government does
not care about foreign prosecutions and hence that allowing witnesses to
invoke the privilege does not discourage governmental overreaching."103
This is bolstered by a showing of the agreements made between the
United States and other countries regarding war criminals.
The court of appeals also stated that the district court erred when it
followed the holding from Lileikis. That holding said "as long as the
United States has a legitimate need for a witness's testimony to further a
governmental interest in enforcing domestic law, and there is no evidence
of improper motivation, the privilege must yield.' 4 The district court
thought that since there was a real reason for wanting to question Balsys,
and it could find no example of governmental overreaching, then Balsys
should not be able to assert the privilege. However, the appeals court said
that this holding "is contrary to both the purposes and the structure of the
protection provided by the Fifth Amendment. '""°5
The court of appeals stated that if this holding were allowed, then it
would almost certainly apply to domestic prosecutions as well. The court
noted that the government will frequently have the same opportunity and
same temptations when a witness faces prosecution abroad as in cases
involving fear of domestic prosecution. In both contexts, the Fifth
Amendment inhibits the pursuit of government goals - in spite of their
legitimacy and importance - in order to deny the government an induce-
ment to use inappropriate methods to achieve those goals." 6
Next the court of appeals looks to how the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the English common law dealing with the privilege against self-
99. See id.
100. See id. at 130-131.
101. See id. at 131.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 131-132 (quoting Lileikis, 899 F.Supp. at 809).
105. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 132.
106. See id.
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incrimination. The appeals court first noted a case where the Supreme
Court said that the privilege did not apply when the federal government
needed testimony that could incriminate the witness under state law. 7 In
that decision, the Murdock case, the Court based its holding on the under-
standing of the English common law on which the Fifth Amendment was
based. The Supreme Court stated that the English rule "does not protect
witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation of the laws of another
country."'08
This decision, however, was overturned thirty years later by Murphy
v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.'09 In that case, the Court
held that the privilege does protect a witness from giving testimony that
could incriminate him in another jurisdiction.' The Murphy court dis-
agreed with the Murdock court's interpretation of English common law. It
believed that another case, "which held that where a witness is under
threat of foreign prosecution the privilege applies as much as where the
witness is exposed to that threat under English law, reflected 'the settled
'English rule' regarding self-incrimination under foreign law."".' Thus,
the court of appeals believes that the Supreme Court's holding in Murphy
agrees with their position that "a witness may invoke the Fifth Amend-
ment out of fear of a foreign prosecution.112
The district court had believed that allowing Balsys to invoke the
privilege would impede the government's ability to perform domestic law
enforcement."' They reasoned that in domestic prosecution, the govern-
ment could do its job because it could offer the witness immunity from
prosecution in the other jurisdiction, thereby still being able to compel the
testimony. However since the government cannot offer immunity from
foreign prosecutions, they lose this ability to get the testimony that they
need."' The Court of Appeals did not seem as convinced about the possi-
ble detriment to the government's ability to compel testimony and "con-
clude[d] that it does not justify denying those who fear foreign prosecu-
tion the right to use the privilege."'"15 In fact, the court noted that the Bill
of Rights was added to the Constitution knowing that it would effect the
107. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 132 (citing U.S. v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931)).
108. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 132 (quoting U.S. v. Murdock, 284 U.S. at 149).
109. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
110. Seeid.
Ill. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 132-133 (citing United States v. McRae, 3 LR.Ch. 79
(Ch.App.1867).
112. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 133.
113. See discussion infra Part III.
114. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 134.
115. See id. (noting that "[t]he fact that allowing the privilege has costs for domestic law
enforcement is not by itself a constitutional argument for disallowing the privilege.") See In
re Cardissi, 352 F.Supp. at 1086.
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ability of the government to enforce the law but it "is the duty of the
courts to enforce constitutional protections despite their costs.' 11
6
However, the court did note that in deciding whether or not there was
a constitutional right, "a court may consider the effect that such a finding
will have on legitimate government needs.""' 7 When analyzing this, the
court of appeals noted two problems and stated that allowing someone to
invoke the privilege when the fear is from abroad would cause serious
harm to the government's ability to perform legitimate domestic law en-
forcement. The first is that the situation that would cause this rarely oc-
curs. They note that in only a "handful" of cases have the witnesses been
able to prove that the fear was real and substantial."'8 In most cases, "the
danger is 'remote and speculative' and, hence, insufficient to justify the
application of the privilege." '' Further, the court also states, that not only
are the amount of cases that apply relatively small, but the class of people
that would be effected is also rather minute.'"
The court said that even if a real and substantial fear was established,
allowing the invocation of the privilege would have a minimal effect on
the government's ability to conduct domestic law enforcement."' The
witness can only use the privilege when it will aid in incriminating him in
a crime.'" The court believes that since the United States is usually only
concerned with domestic violations and what the witness fears is from
foreign violations, then "the information sought by the United States will
usually not fall within the scope of the silence that the Fifth Amendment
allows to that witness. ' 123
Another example of the rarity of this situation is that silence may be
used in civil proceeding to draw an adverse inference. 24 Accordingly,
116. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 134. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487,489 (1944).
117. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 134.
118. See id. at 135. See Gecas, 50 F.3d at 1556-62; Araneta, 794 F.2d at 923-25; United
States v. Ragauskas, No. 94 C. 2325, 1995 WL 86640, at *3-4 (N.D.ll].1995); Moses, 779
F.Supp. at 861-870; Trucis, 89 F.R.D. at 673; Mishima, 507 F.Supp. at 132-33; Cardissi, 351
F.Supp. at 1083-1084
119. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 135. See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc.,
847 F.2d 1052, 1064-65 (3d Cir. 1988), aff d on other grounds, 493 U.S. 400, 110 S.Ct. 701,
(1990); United States v. Joudis, 800 F.2d 159, 163-64 (7th Cir.1986); In re President's
Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191, 1198-1199 (11th Cir.1985); Chevrier, 748
F.2d at 104-105 (2d Cir.1984); Gilboe, 699 F.2d at 75-78; Flanagan, 691 F.2d at 121-124;
Nigro, 705 F.2d at 1226-28; In re Baird, 668 F.2d 432, 434 (8th Cir.1982); United States v.
Yanagita, 552 F.2d 940, 946-947 (2d Cir.1977); In re Tiemey, 465 F.2d 806, 811-812 (5th
Cir.1972).
120. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 135 (noting that only aliens may be deported and then, only if
there is a treaty).
121. See id. at 135-136.
122. See id. at 136. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
123. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136. See Cardissi, 351 F.Supp. at 1086.
124. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136 (noting that in Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (176N th.
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since a deportation is a civil hearing, the government could use Balsys's
silence to aid in the deportation. However his silence alone would not be
enough to deport him."2 "[I]f there is other evidence, the witness's si-
lence may contribute to a decision to deport the alien."' 26 In fact, other
evidence is usually required anyway.1 27 Thus, with the benefit of being
able to draw inferences, the hazard to the government is even further re-
duced.
The second problem with saying that the government will be harmed
by allowing Balsys to invoke this privilege comes from the fact that there
will be situations, when allowing a person like Balsys to invoke the
privilege will negatively affect the government's interest. But the court of
appeals noted that there were ways around this "[flor methods may exist
by which the United States can constitutionally bypass the privilege ei-
ther by eliminating the likelihood that the witness will be sent to the ju-
risdiction that would prosecute him, or by granting some form of con-
structive immunity to the witness.""'8 The court noted that neither depor-
tation nor extradition were "fixed practices."' 29 In fact, both Congress and
the executive branch have power to control both.'O "It follows that Con-
gress can pass laws regulating extradition and deportation in cases in-
volving the privilege, just as it has enacted immunity statutes in the past
to deal with fear of domestic prosecution."'' Accordingly, "[b]oth Con-
gress and the executive branch may thus be able to limit dramatically the
domestic law enforcement costs of the interpretation of Fifth Amendment
that we accept today by developing schemes that parallel domestic im-
munity statutes. '
Thus, in the end, the court of appeals decided that the negative effect
on domestic enforcement efforts of allowing the privilege is of the same
order when the witness fears foreign prosecution as when he fears do-
mestic prosecution. In addition, the negative effect is not substantial
enough to undermine the fact that granting the privilege to those who fear
foreign prosecution is consistent with the language of the Fifth Amend-
Supreme Court said that the Fifth Amendment "does not forbid adverse inferences against
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered
against them." Id. at 31S.
125. Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,455 (1985)).
126 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136 (relying on United States v. Stelmokas, 100 F.3d 302, 311 (3d
Cir.1996)).
127 Balsys, 119 F.3d at 136 ("Finally, the witness's testimony may not be the only source
of the information the government seeks.") Id.
128. See id. at 137.
129. See id. at 138.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132 See id. at 139.
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ment, with its aims, and with the reasoning of the most relevant Supreme
Court cases. 133
In dealing with the issue of waiver, the court of appeals agreed that a
witness may give up his right to the Fifth Amendment protection and this
"waiver need not be knowing and voluntary."'" However, this waiver
does not apply in two separate proceedings. 35
The district court had said that the proceeding in 1961 and the cur-
rent OSI investigation were the same proceeding. 3 6 The court of appeals
disagreed by saying that case law showed that the time differential proved
that they were two separate proceedings.' But even if they were deemed
to be one proceeding, the court of appeals said that Balsys could not have
waived his Fifth Amendment right since, at the time of the interview in
1961, he had no Fifth Amendment rights since he had yet to enter the
country. '3
V. THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Majority's Decision
After losing at the appeals court level, the government appealed to
the United States Supreme Court. In a decision written by Justice Souter,
the Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeals by holding that the
fear of foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of the Fifth Amendment's
self-incrimination clause. 139
The Court agreed that the privilege applies to resident aliens, and
had the fear been from a possible state or federal proceeding then Balsys
would have been able to invoke it."4 But the Court said that the issue in
this case was "whether a criminal prosecution by a foreign government
not subject to our constitutional guarantees presents a 'criminal case' for
the purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination."''
The Court noted that Balsys relied on the textual difference between
the Sixth Amendment, which only applies to domestic proceedings, and
the Fifth Amendment which includes the much broader statement, "any
criminal case."' 42 This argument is further made in the amicus brief, in
that "any criminal case" is argued to be just that, "regardless of the prose-
133. Balsys, 19 F.3dat 134.
.134. See id.
135. See id.
136. See discussion infra Part Il1.
137. Balsys, 119 F.3dat 140.
138. See id.
139. United States v. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998).
140. See id. at 2221. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); see also Kas-
tigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
141. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2222.
142. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V & VI.
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cuting authority."143 But the Court, applying the rule of noscitur a sociis,
said that this "argument overlooks the cardinal rule to construe provisions
in context." 1 The context of the Fifth Amendment seems to only refer to
proceedings in a domestic context. Thus, the Court states that "[b]ecause
none of these provisions is implicated except by action of the government
that it binds, it would have been strange to choose such associates for a
Clause meant to take a broader view, and it would be strange to find a
sweep in the Clause now.""
The Court noted that even its own precedent seems to support this
"so-called same-sovereign interpretation."'" They quoted an early case
written by Chief Justice Marshall that stated that "the Constitution's
'limitations on power... are naturally, and, we think, necessarily applica-
ble to the government created by the instrument,' and not to 'distinct
[state] governments, framed by different persons for different
purposes."147
When looking at past cases, the Court noted that they all dealt with
the "significance for the federal privilege of possible use of testimony in
state prosecution."'" In most of those cases, the Court's holding was in
line with the idea of requiring the potential prosecution to be from the
same jurisdiction. In another case deciding whether or not the federal
privilege could be raised when the fear was from a state court, the Court
held 'that 'the possibility that information given by the witness might be
used' by the other government is, as a matter of law, 'a danger so unsub-
stantial and remote' that it fails to trigger the right to invoke the privi-
lege."'14
9
The Court noted that this question was "definitely settled" in the case
of United States v. Murdock.5 ° In that case, the Court concluded "that
one under examination in a federal tribunal could not refuse to answer on
account of probable incrimination under state law.''. The Murdock court
143. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2222-2223. See Brief for National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers et al. As Amici Curiae 5.
144. See id. at 2223. See King V. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U.S. 215,221 (1991).
145. See id. at 2223.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 2224 (quoting Barron ex. Rel. Tieman v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 247, 8
LEd. 672 (1833)).
148. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2224. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896);see also Jack v.
Kansas, 199 U.S. 372 ((1905).
149. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2224 (1998) (quoting Hale v.
Henkel, 210 U.S. 43 (1906)).
150. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2224 (1998) (citing U.S. v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141 (1931)).
151. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2224 (1998) (quoting U.S. v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141,396 (1931)).
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stated that the English common law, on which the Fifth Amendment is
based, "does not protect witnesses against disclosing offenses in violation
of the laws of another country.'
' 52
The Court notes that some have "suggested that our precedent ad-
dressing fear of prosecution by a government other than the compelling
authority fails to reflect the Murdock rule uniformly." '153 The Court first
made note of the Saline Bank case where the defendants claimed that
their answers would incriminate them under state law.' The Court, how-
ever, noted that this case was about a violation of a state law and the Fed-
eral Court was just fulfilling the state law.1 55
The next case was Ballman v. Fagin, where Ballman tried to assert
the privilege in a federal proceeding based on his fear of incriminating
himself under state law."56 But again, this case was made special because
the Court in that case ruled that Ballman faced not only a fear of state
prosecution, but federal prosecution as well.'57 So both of these cases
were able to comply with the holding that the fear had to come from the
same jurisdiction. But these cases were "superseded by Murdock with its
unequivocal holding that prosecution in a state jurisdiction not bound by
the Clause is beyond the purview of the privilege."'
58
The Court next goes on to study how the rule in Murphy affected
Balsys's claim. In 1964, the Court in Murphy overruled Murdock and
held "that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects a
state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and
a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal
law."'59 This case coincided with the decision in Malloy v. Hogan,
"which applied the doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment due process
incorporation to the Self-Incrimination Clause, so as to bind the State as
well as the National Government to recognize the privilege.""
When looking at Murphy, the Court noted that there were "two alterna-
tive rationales.' 61 It is the first of these two perspectives that the majority
152. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2225 (1998) (citing U.S. v. Murdock,
284 U.S. 141, 149 (1931)). See King of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, 7 State Trials (N.S.) 1050,
1068; see also Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. at 738.
153. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2225.
154. United States v. Saline Bank of Va., 7 LEd. 69 (1828).
155. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2225-2226.
156- United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2226 (1998) (citing Ballmann v. Fagin,
200 U.S. 186 (1906)).
157. See id.
158. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2226.
159. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2226 (1998) (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 77-78 (1964)).
160. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2226-2227 (1998) (citing Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)).
161. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2226.
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not only agrees with, but says agrees with the holding in Malloy. The
Malloy decision seemed to end the Murdock prohibition of only applying
the privilege to one jurisdiction. "After Malloy, the Fifth Amendment
limitation could no longer be seen as framed for one jurisdiction alone,
each jurisdiction having instead become subject to the same claim of
privilege flowing from one limitation.""6 The Murphy decision picked up
on this, and stated "that if a witness could not assert the privilege [when
they faced incrimination in another jurisdiction], the witness could be
'whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and federal law
even though the... privilege is applicable to each."'163 Since Malloy had
made the privilege applicable to both the state and federal governments,
"it would therefore have been intolerable to allow a prosecutor in one or
the other jurisdiction to eliminate the privilege by offering immunity less
complete than the privilege's dual jurisdictional reach."'" After this rule,
any immunity option that was to be given was binding on both the state
and the federal jurisdictions."
However, the Court noted that there was another possible rationale
when looking at Murphy that was more in support of Balsys's claims.
This view would give the Clause a much greater scope. As the Court
notes, in order to accept this view, you have to reject the Court's earlier
description of English common law as stated in Murdock. To do this, the
Murphy court relied on two British cases in which it said that the privi-
lege was invoked "based on the fear of prosecution in a foreign jurisdic-
tion."' Yet, when looking at these two cases, the Court noted that "the
judicial system to which the witness' fears related was subject to the
same legislative sovereignty that had created the courts in which the
privilege was claimed."167 The Court went on to note that at the time of
those two cases and for years after, English law was silent as to whether
or not the privilege could be invoked when the fear was from a foreign
162. See id. at 2227.
163. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2227 (1998) (quoting Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
164. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2227. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 457, n. 42.
165. Note that Murphy still applied to the federal and state governments because of Mal-
loy. Since there was not an analogous decision for foreign governments, the Court held that
Murdock still applies in those cases. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2227-2230.
t66. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218 (1998) (citing East India Co. v.
Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749)). (Defendant afraid of prosecution in Calcutta, then
an English colony.) See Brownsword v. Edwards, 28 Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750) (Defendant
feared prosecution by an English ecclesiastical court.)
167. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 22-2229 (1998) (referring to East
Aindia Co. v. Campbell, 27 Eng. Rep. 1010 (Ex. 1749) and Brownsword v. Edwards, 28
Eng. Rep. 157 (Ch. 1750)).
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country. 168
The English courts did, in the King of the Two Sicilies v. Willcox,
"decline to allow the defendants to assert the privilege based on their fear
of prosecution in Sicily."'" This English decision was based on two
points. One, was that the court believed that the privilege only referred to
"matters that might be criminal under the laws of England," and the sec-
ond was that they did not believe that the defendants would ever leave
England and return to Sicily. 170
However, the majority noted that the Murphy court thought the rule
in the King of the Two Sicilies was "undermined by the subsequent case
of United States v. McRae.' 7' In McRae, although that court did not say
the privilege could be used anytime there was a fear of foreign prosecu-
tion, it did note two distinctions. One distinction was that the 'presumed
ignorance of the Judge as the foreign law' on which the King of the Two
Sicilies rested has been 'completely removed by the admitted statements
upon the pleadings.'1 2 The second "was that McRae presented the un-
usual circumstance that the party seeking to compel the testimony, the
United States, was also the party that would prosecute any crime under its
laws that might thereby be revealed."'73
The majority in the present case does not believe that McRae sup-
ports a finding that the privilege should be invoked whenever the fear is
from a foreign prosecution. 174 The majority believes the court in Murphy
overreached its power when it overruled the King of the Two Sicilies'75
But the majority noted that even if Murphy did show a new devel-
opment in English common law, it would not matter in interpreting the
Fifth Amendment. 76 "The presumed influence of English law on the in-
tentions of the Framers hardly invests the Framers with clairvoyance, and
subsequent English developments are not attributable to the Framers by
some rule of renvoi.' 177 Accordingly, the majority states that "to the ex-
tent that the Murphy majority went beyond its response to Malloy and
undercut Murdock's rationale on [unsound] historical grounds, its rea-
soning cannot be accepted now.""17
168. Balsys, 118 S.Ct at 2229. "[Alnd the Vice-Chancellor so stated in 1851." Id.
169. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2229 (1998) (citing King of Two
Sicilies v. Willcox, 61 Eng. Rep. 116 (Ch. 1851)).
170. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2229.
171. United States v. Aloyzas Balsys, 118 S.Ct. 2218, 2229 (1998) (citing United States v.
McRae, 3 LR. Ch. 79 (Ch.App. 1867)).
172. See id. at 2229 (citing United States v. McRae, 3 L.R. Ch. 79 at 84 (Ch.App.1867)).
173. See id. at 2229 (citing United States v. McRae, 3 L.R. Ch. 79 at 87 (Ch.App.1867)).
174. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2229.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 2230.
177. See id.
178. See id. The majority notes that the history in Murphy has long been criticized. Id. at
1999]
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The majority then lists its three main disagreements with the dissent.
First, the majority believes that when the Clause is read in context with
the rest of the Fifth Amendment, it is obviously "limiting its principle to
concern with prosecution by a sovereign that is itself bound by the
Clause." '79 They do not believe that the language makes the Clause in-
clude those jurisdictions which are not bound by the Constitution.
Second, the majority relies "on the force of our precedent, notably
note 11 which states:
Murphy, 378 U.S., at 81, n. 1, 84 S.Ct., at 1619, n. 1 (Harlan, J., concurring
in judgment) ("The English rule is not clear"); United States v. (Under Seal),
794 F.2d at 927 ("The Court's scholarship with respect to English law in this
regard has been attacked, see Note. 69 Va. L.Rev. at 893-94, ... We do not
enter the dispute at to whether Murphy represents a correct statement of the
English rule at a particular time because we do not think that the Murphy
holding depended upon the correctness of the Court's understanding of the
state of English law and reliance thereon as the sole basis for decision.
Rather, Murphy proceeds as a logical consequence to the holding in Malloy
v. Hogan ... ") Note, Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
and Fear of Foreign Prosecution, 96 Colum. L.Rev.1940, 1944-1946, 1949,
and nn. 79-81 (1996) ("The uncertainty of English law on [the question
whether the privilege can be invoked based on fear of prosecution] casts
doubt on the Supreme Court's holding in Murphy, which was based on the
assertion that McRae presents the settled 'English rule' regarding self-
incrimination under foreign law." Indeed, the Murphy Court's reliance on its
ideas of the "true" English rule has been criticized by commentators and its
reading of British law was essentially overruled by the British Parliament.
Murphy's reliance on mistaken interpretation and application of English law
weakens its precedential value. (footnotes omitted)); Note, The Reach of the
Fifth Amendment Privilege When Domestically Compelled Testimony May
Be Used in a Foreign Country's Court, 69 Va. L.Rev. 875, 893-895 (1983)
("[Tihe English rule argument has three fatal flaws. First, the so- called
English rule, decided in 1867, never was the English rule despite overstate-
ments by several American commentators and the Murphy Court. British
commentators remained uncertain for nearly a century about the extent to
which, if at all, their privilege protected against foreign incrimination....
Second, the English courts had not decided a case involving incrimination
under the criminal laws of independent foreign sovereigns by the time our
Constitution was framed. The on y English cases involving independent sov-
ereigns were decided more than sixty years later. Thus, even if the fifth
amendment embodied the English common law at the time it was framed, the
privilege did not incorporate any rule concerning foreign incrimination. Fi-
nally, even if the English rule protected against foreign incrimination, the
Supreme Court in Zicarelli indicated that it had not formally adopted the
rule in Murphy." (footnotes omitted)); Capra, The Fifth Amendment and the
Risk of Foreign Prosecution, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 8, 1991, p. 3 ("[Dlespite Justice
Goldberg's assertions in Murphy, it is clear that there was never a 'true' or
uniform English rule.... [T]o the extent that the English rule would be perti-
nent to the Fifth Amendment privilege, it would have had to exist at the time
the Fifth Amendment was adopted. Yet, as even Justice Goldberg admitted
in Murphy, the English cases involving independent sovereigns were de-
cided more than 60 years after the Fifth Amendment was adopted"); see also
Law Reform Committee, Sixteenth Report, 1967, Cmmd. 3472, & 11, p. 7
(explaining that English common law on the question is not "wholly consis-
tent").
Id. at note 11
179- Balsvs, 118 S.Ct. at 2231.
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Murdock, as confirming this same sovereign principle, as adapted to re-
flect the post-Malloy requirement of immunity effective against both sov-
ereigns subject to the one privilege under the National Constitution. ' '180
Other countries do not have to allow such immunities, since they are not
bound by our Constitution. The dissent, as the majority notes, gives more
weight to the language from Saline Bank as opposed to Murdock.
Last, with all of the noted inaccuracies, the majority does not agree
with the Murphy court's description of the common law.'8' They also
"read none of the common-law cases as authority inconsistent with our
contextual reading of the Clause.'"
The Court did note that there remained one more problem with the
Murphy decision that had to be overcome in order to deny Balsys the
right to assert the privilege. They noted that the majority in Murphy in-
cluded a catalog of "Policies of the Privilege" which listed, what they
believed to be, "many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions."' 3 As the majority in Balsys noted, most of these seem to point
directly to domestic applications, but some "might suggest a concern
broad enough to encompass foreign prosecution and accordingly to sup-
port a more expansive theory of the privilege than the Murdock under-
standing would allow."'" However, to support this, one must believe the
Murphy court's interpretation of the English common law cases which
the majority in Balsys has rejected.8 5 But, the Court states that when this
interpretation of the common law is rejected, then the Murdock decision
"must be seen as precedent at odds with Balsys' claim."'8 6
Furthermore, as the Court noted, the Murphy court does not seem to




183. See id. at 2232 (citing Murphy, 378 U.S., at 55:
It reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self- in-
criminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses;
our sense of fair play which dictates a fair state-individual balance by re-
quiring the government to leave the individual alone until good cause is
shown for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest with
the individual to shoulder the entire load; our respect for the inviolability of
the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private en-
clave where he may lead a private life, our distrust of self-deprecatory
statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes a shelter
to the guilty, is often a protection to the innocent. (citations omitted) Balsys,
at 2231.)
184. Bafsys, 118 S.Ct. at 223t.
185. See id.
186. See id.
186 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 6:163
raise if the scope of the Clause were increased. Balsys wishes to include
the "protection of personal inviolability and the privacy of a testimonial
enclave" in the scope of the Clause.1 17 But as the Court states, if "these
values were reliable guides to the actual scope of protection under the
Clause, they would be seen to demand a very high degree of protection
indeed."' 8 But the majority notes that "extending protection as Balsys
requests would change the balance of private and governmental interests
that have seemingly been accepted for as long as there has been Fifth
Amendment doctrine." 18 9
The Court also disagrees with Balsys's contention that the policy
catalog in Murphy supports the prevention of governmental
overreaching.' 9 In order to believe this argument, one most subscribe to
the theory of "cooperative internationalism" which is similar to the theory
of "cooperative federalism" recognized in Murphy. 9' But since there is
no counterpart to Malloy that imposes the Fifth Amendment to other sov-
ereigns, then the Court states that "[a]ny analogy must, instead, be to the
pre-Murphy era when the States were not bound by the privilege.""
But, the Court says, even if the theories of "cooperative federalism"
and "cooperative internationalism" did advocate increasing the scope of
the privilege, Balsys has not offered enough evidence to justify the in-
crease. In fact, the Court states that "we are accordingly unable to dismiss
the position of the United States in this case, that domestic law enforce-
ment would suffer serious consequences if fear of foreign prosecution
were recognized as sufficient."'93
The Court goes on to say that one day, there might be the kind of in-
ternational cooperation where a claim like Balsys' could be given the
protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause.'94 But many things would
have to occur, one of which being the enactment of substantially similar
criminal codes."' 95 But as the Court says, such speculation should be left
for "another day."' 96
B. Justice Stevens' Concurring Opinion
In a short concurring opinion, Justice Stevens emphasized a few
points. He does not believe that the protection extends to foreign courts.
187. See id. at 2232.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2233.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 2233-2234.
193. See id. at 2234-2235.
194. See id. at 2235.
195. See id.
196. Balsys, 118 S.C t. at 2235.
FIFH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AFTER BALSYS
He states that "[tihe primary office of the clause at issue in this case is to
afford protection to persons whose liberty has been placed in jeopardy in
an American tribunal."'97 He does not believe that the Bill of Rights was
"intended to have any effect on the conduct of foreign proceedings." ' In
fact, he believes that if Balsys' view was accepted, then we would be
giving the "power [to] foreign governments to impair the administration
of justice in this country.' 199
C. Justice Ginsberg's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsberg, in her short dissent, believes that the privilege
against self-incrimination is a major step in the civilization of man.2 ° In
her opinion, the privilege defines a rule for how agents of the United
States should act. It provides a guide on how they should conduct them-
selves, especially when receiving testimony.2"' She also believes that it
applies to people who fear prosecutions that are either foreign or domes-
tic.' But to Ginsburg it is more than a safeguard; it is an "expression of
our view of civilized governmental conduct."' 3
D. Justice Breyer's Dissenting Opinion That Justice Ginsberg Joined.
In his dissent, Justice Breyer believes that Fifth Amendment privi-
lege should be broad enough to cover the fear of foreign prosecutions. He
begins his argument by attempting to show that the word "any" in the
broad interpretation is more in line with "the view this Court has taken
and should continue to take." He points out that the majority based its
decision on the idea that the Murphy court had incorrectly stated the
precedent on this issue. 05 But Breyer disagrees and bases his dissent on
the opinion that Murphy is the correct law in dealing with the privilege.
Since Murphy abolished the "same sovereign" rule, then the privilege
should be applied here.206
Breyer notes that if he is correct in his understanding of Murphy,
then Balsys should be able to invoke the privilege.'" He notes that not
every threat from a foreign government is reasonable, but where it is,
197. See id. at 2236
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2236.
201. See id. at 2237.
202. See id.
203. See id. (citing E. GRISWOLD, THE FIFrH AMENDMENT TODAY 7-9 (1955).
204. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2237.
205. See id. citing Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, 378 U.S. 52
(1964).
206. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2237-2238.
207. See id. at 2238.
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then the privilege should apply."
The majority, he believes, say that Murphy "turns upon considera-
tions of federalism - the need to consider 'state and federal jurisdic-
tions... as one' for purposes of applying the privilege."' He notes that
the majority reads the Murphy case as stating that the fear must come
from the "same sovereign.""0 But in support of this, the majority points
to two statements in Murphy.21 1 "Since the first statement mentions only a
reason for reconsidering Murdock, since the second offers support on
either analysis, and since neither refers to any 'alternative rational[el' for
decision, the majority's evidence for its reinterpretation of Murphy seems
rather skimpy." ' (internal citations omitted)
Breyer then lists six reasons that, if one were to focus "on the basic
nature and history of the underlying right," would reject the same sover-
eign rule from Murdock.21'3 Thus, Breyer believes that the Court in Mur-
208. See id. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472
(1972) (threat must be "real and substantial").
209. Bats vs, 118 S.Ct. at 2238 (quoting Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2227-2228.
210. Seeid.at2238.
211. See id. stating:
In the first, Murphy said that Malloy v. Hogan, which incorporated the Fifth
Amendment privilege as part of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause, "necessitates a reconsideration" of United States v. Murdock, which
had held that the Fifth Amendment protected an individual only from prose-
cutions by the Federal Government. In the second, Murphy, mentioned, as
one of many items of support for its analysis, that most Fifth Amendment
policies are defeated "when a witness 'can be whipsawed into incriminating
imself under both state and federal law even though' the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is applicable to each." (internal citations
omitted)
212. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2238.
213. See id. at 2238-2239 stating:
First, Murphy holds that the "constitutional privilege" itself, not that privi-
lege together with principles of federalism, "protects... a federal witness
against incrimination under state... law. Second, it says explicitly that it
"reject[s]" the Murdock rule, not because of considerations of federalism
arising out of Malloy, but because it is "unsupported by history or policy"
and represents a "deviation" from a "correct... construction" of the privilege
in light of its "history, policies and purposes." Third, about half of the
opinion consists of an effort to demonstrate that the privilege, as understood
by the English courts and by American courts prior to Murdock, protected
individuals from compelled testimony in the face of a realistic threat of
prosecution by any sovereign, not simply by the same sovereign that com-
pelled the testimony. Fourth, the rest ofthe Court's analysis consists of a
discussion of the purposes of the privilege, which purposes, in the Court's
view, lead to a similar conclusion. Fifth, the Court explicitly rejects the
analysis of commentators who argued for a "same sovereign" rule on the
ground that their understanding of the privilege's purposes was incomplete.
Sixth, the Court nowhere describes its rationale in "silver platter" or similar
terms that could lead one to conclude that its rule is prophylactic, enforce-
ment-based, or rests upon any rationale other than that the privilege is not
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phy intended for the privilege to apply to other sovereigns just as it does
to the federal and state governments. "In other words, we must ask not,
'what did Murphy hold,' but 'was Murphy right?""'2 4
Breyer disagrees with the majority's opinion that the reasoning in
Murphy was both "'fatally flawed' and legally [un]sound."'215 Breyer
does not believe that the English common law "embodied a 'same sover-
eign' rule" like the majority and the court in Murdock do.216 He believes
that the true English rule as of the time of Murdock, insofar as any of
these cases reveal that rule, was not a "same sovereign" rule, but a rule
that the privilege did not apply to prosecutions by another sovereign
where the danger of any such prosecution was speculative or insubstan-
tial. 17
Thus there was no error in the Murphy decision according to Breyer.
Breyer does not believe that the majority has listed any reason that
would convince him to reject Murphy and bring back Murdock. He noted
the majority's opinion that the historical basis of Murphy is flawed, but
believes that even if that is true, "we would need something more to
abandon Murphy, for it is the most recent, and thereby governing, prece-
dent. 218
But regardless of precedent, Breyer states that he "still disagree[s]
with the Court's conclusion." '219 He agrees with the court of appeals that
the Fifth Amendment has several purposes and, he believes, that all of
these purposes support the conclusion of the court of appeals.' He states,
"[t]he Court has often found, for example, that the privilege recognizes
the unseemliness, the insult to human dignity, created when a person
must convict himself out his own mouth."'" In Breyer's mind, these prin-
ciples are "no less at stake" when the threat is from a foreign, rather than
domestic prosecution.? He also points out that the privilege protects per-
sonal dignity by decreasing the chance of an overzealous governmentprosecution."2
Another one of the points of disagreement between Breyer and the
limited to protection against prosecution by the same jurisdiction that com-
pels the testimony. (internal citations omitted)
214. See id. at 2239.
215. See id. at 2228, 2229-2230.
216. See id. at 2239.
217. See id. citing Queen v. Boyes, 121 Eng. Rep. 730, 738 (Q.B.1861) ("[T]he danger to
be apprehended must be real and appreciable... not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstan-
tial character.")
218. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2240-2241.
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majority is that Breyer believes the court of appeals' theory of "coopera-
tive internationalism." '224 He notes the drastic increase of cooperation
between the United States and foreign governments to fight crime as well
as improvements in transportation and communications that have made
nations closer.22 Thus with the large number of treaties, agreements and
agencies created to foster this kind of cooperation, he believes "that the
United States has a significant stake in the foreign prosecution at issue
here." 6 So, to Breyer, this is analogous to the Murphy court's belief in
cooperation between the federal and state govemments."
He also disagrees with the majority's policy reasons for not allowing
Balsys to assert the privilege. One of the major reasons for this is that
Breyer does not share in the majority's concern that allowing this privi-
lege would give another country the right to "unreasonably interfere with
the work of [United States] law enforcement." 22 He thinks that fear is
"overstated. '' m First, he agrees with the court of appeals that the actual
number of cases like Balsys' are rare.2' Even if the government were
kept from compelling testimony, the testimony desired is about a foreign
crime, not a domestic one, so the United States' interest is small.2 3' Also,
since the witness' silence can be used in a civil case, the government
would lose very little.2" Even so, the United States still has the power to
'take steps sufficient to make the threat of foreign prosecution insubstan-
tial. ' 233 Accordingly in Breyer's view, to allow Balsys to assert the privi-
lege would not only follow the fundamental principles of the Fifth
Amendment, it follows Court precedent as well.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
When looking at the disagreements between the majority and the
dissent, it seems that they mainly differ in how they interpret two cases -
Murphy and Murdock.234 Both sides make two rather compelling, and at
times confusing arguments. But in the end, extending the scope of the




228. See id. at 2244.
229. See id.
230. See id. See discussion infra Part IV.
231. Baysys, 118 S.Ct. at 2244-2245.
232. See id. at 2245.
233. See id. The Government, Breyer believes, could promise not to deport, get the foreign
nation to promise not to use the information, or decline a request for extradition. Id.
234. See discussion infra Part V; see Murphy, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); see also Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931).
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privilege to include the fear of foreign prosecution is beyond the scope of
the Fifth Amendment.
A. Disagreement Over English Common Law
Perhaps one of the main disagreements between the two sides is their
different opinions as to what exactly is the correct English common law
on point. The majority believe that it is the analysis given in Murdock,
whereas the dissent believes that it is from the later Murphy decision. On
this point I have to agree with the majority. They make a much more in
depth analysis of the relevant case law to show that the cases in Murdock
prove that English common law recognized the "same-sovereign" rule.
235
They also illustrate how many others disagree with the historical inter-
pretation of the common law in Murphy.
236
The dissent, on the other hand, seems to rely on Murphy because it is
the decision that is later in time. They believe that just as Murphy abol-
ishes the "same sovereign" rule for the states and federal government, it
should do the same for the United States government and foreign gov-
ernments. 2 7 But this ignores the majority's opinion that the only reason
that Murphy applies to the federal and state governments is because of the
decision in Malloy that applied the Fourteenth Amendment to the
states.2 11 So, even though the historical analysis in Murphy is still incor-
rect, the privilege can still be applied equally in both the states and the
federal government. The majority states that since there is no analogous
rule that would apply the Fourteenth Amendment to foreign governments,
then the "same-sovereign" precedent in Murdock is still alive when deal-
ing with foreign governments.239
B. Difference Over Catalog Of "Policies Of The Privilege"
The dissent also puts heavy weight on the catalog of "Policies of the
Privilege" in Murphy.2' But, as the majority points out, this skips the
problem of policy concerns that the catalog brings up.24 Here, the major-
ity makes the better argument.
First, as the majority states, in order to believe the catalog of poli-
cies, you would have to believe in the flawed history in Murphy. Second,
the Murphy decision does not "weigh the host of competing policy con-
cerns that would be raised in a legitimate reconsideration of the Clause's
scope."'242 Balsys and the dissent believe that a general personal testimo-
235. Balsys, 118 S.Ct at 2224-2230.
236. See supra note 177.
237. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2224-2230.
238. See id. at 2227-2230.
239. See id. at 2230-2231.
240. See supra note 212.
241. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2231-2235.
242. See id. at 2231.
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nial privacy is created by the Fifth Amendment.243 To follow these ex-
actly would put an enormous strain on the system and destroy "the bal-
ance of private and governmental interests that has seemingly been ac-
cepted for as long as there has been Fifth Amendment doctrine." 2"
C. Cooperative Federalism And Cooperative Internationalism
The dissent wants to look at the discussion in Murphy about "coop-
erative federalism" and make it analogous to the international level.245
The majority does not seem to put as much weight behind this
argument.2 6 In fact, the majority does not give it enough weight. With the
rapid increase of both transportation and technology, countries are not as
far apart as they were when Constitution and the common law were being
created. But today, the fear of not understanding other countries' laws or
the belief that it is difficult to find out what is happening in another
country does not seem as great.
The dissent also makes the argument that if the executive branch or
the Congress could make a law that would allow the government to have
the power not to deport people like Balsys and offer that in the place of
immunity.247 But that statement does not make much sense. The govern-
ment has entered into agreements with these countries, so to overlook
these agreements and not deport these people would be wrong. The dis-
sent seems to be saying that we can make deals with other countries, but
we can always go back on them if necessary. This should not be allowed.
Accordingly, even with the increase in technology making it easier to
communicate with other countries, that is not enough to allow someone to
assert the privilege.
D. Privilege Available Only To Government That Created It
These reasons are used to support the main reason that the majority
ruled against Balsys. They believe that the privilege is available only to
protect those from the government that created the privilege. 24 Even
though the United States has close relationships with other countries,
something that happens in another country should not affect how the
criminal justice system in this country operates. Although the Framers
could not have thought that communication would be the way it is today,
they still could not have intended for the Constitution to apply in cases
like this.
243. See id. at 2242-2245.
244. See id. at 2232.
245. See id. at 2243-2244.
246. See id. at 2233-2237..
247. Balsys, 118 S.Ct. at 2245.
248. Id. at 2222-2226.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, the majority of the Supreme Court did not support Bal-
sys's claims that he should be able to invoke the privilege. Although Jus-
tice Breyer in his dissent makes some valid points, they are just not
strong enough. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
can only, and should only, be used to protect people against the govern-
ment that created it.

